Darius III (Codomannus)

No Persian royal inscription or monument of Darius III survives. There are a few Babylonian documents, including the Uruk king list, an astronomical diary interpreted as dating Gaugamela and Alexander’s entry into Babylon, and astronomical observations that give his personal name. Everything else comes from Alexander historians writing centuries later: Diodorus, Arrian, Curtius, Plutarch and Justin. The only useful visual source, Badian says, is the Alexander Mosaic from Pompeii.

These sources built Darius mainly as a foil to Alexander. Any verdict on his character must allow for that.

When only the victor writes history, we must ask what the defeated would have said.

Born c. 380, with a distant link to the royal house. In Artaxerxes III’s Cadusian war he won fame in single combat and became satrap of Armenia; later perhaps head of the royal courier service. He married Stateira, a royal princess. In 336 Bagoas put him on the throne, and Darius soon disposed of him. After the Granicus (334), Issus (333) and Gaugamela (331) he was killed by his own companions in July 330.

Badian shows how his weak legitimacy shaped his choices: he distrusted powerful commanders and built no unified command in the west.

A ruler unsure of his legitimacy keeps capable people at a distance, and everyone pays the price.

Justin (10.3) is the only Greek or Latin source to give his earlier name, Codomannus. Babylonian documents write his personal name Ar-ta-šá-a-ta, probably Old Persian *Artašiyāta, “happy in Arta”. Darius was the throne name he took at his accession.

Choosing the name Darius claimed a link to the great founder, and with it legitimacy.

Names are tools of legitimacy; every new regime chooses a past for itself.

In 334–333 Darius raised an army with unprecedented speed and by October 333 was crossing the Taurus; exploiting a failure of Alexander’s intelligence, he appeared at his rear. But he fought on the coastal plain of Issus, where his superior cavalry could not envelop the enemy’s left. Alexander routed the king; Darius escaped before the battle was over and his mother, wife and children were captured.

Greek historians charged him with cowardice, though bravery is his best-attested quality. Badian thinks it more probable that he kept his head and understood that the only chance of saving the kingdom lay in saving himself, since there was no successor who could command allegiance.

A system that hangs everything on one life forces its leader to choose between honour and the country’s survival.

After Issus, while Tyre held out for a year, Darius offered peace: the cession of large territories, recognition of Alexander as an equal, a large ransom for his family and a marriage alliance. Alexander rejected everything and demanded that Darius recognise him as his superior. Arrian gives Alexander’s reply as a letter.

Badian warns that the documents quoted in Greek sources are “as usual fictitious”. The letter should be read as the historian’s statement of Alexander’s position, not as a record. Badian also explains why Alexander could not accept: after a peace, Darius would be free to attack when he chose.

When one side demands total submission, negotiation is no longer negotiation.

Darius lacked enough Greek mercenaries, so he improved his native troops’ equipment on the Greek model. He had superior cavalry, elephants and scythed chariots, and levelled the plain of Gaugamela, north of Arbela, for the chariots. Alexander did not attack by night and kept the Persians standing to arms until morning. On 1 October 331 the Persian cavalry succeeded against Parmenio, but Alexander charged through a gap at Darius in the centre and the line broke.

Badian: by deciding to wait for the attack, Darius gave up the initiative. A Babylonian astronomical diary confirms the date; it is one of the few points where the Greek narrative can be checked against a non-Greek record.

Superior numbers and wealth without discipline and flexibility do not bring victory.

Darius went to Ecbatana to gain time; Alexander took Babylon, Susa and Persepolis and in May 330 burned the palaces of Persepolis. As Alexander approached, Darius moved east with a few nobles and a small force. Bessus and Nabarzanes bound him in golden fetters and, near Hecatompylus, left him stabbed before Alexander arrived. Bessus took the tiara and the name Artaxerxes.

Badian suggests that Alexander’s haste to reach Darius alive, and the conspirators’ determination to prevent it, imply that Darius was ready to acknowledge Alexander as his superior and so give him legitimacy. This is a conjecture; the sources do not say so.

When a ruling elite weighs loyalty against its own interests, a king without an army becomes his companions’ hostage.

The Alexander historians, Arrian especially, call Darius cowardly and “effeminate” and set him against Alexander’s heroism. Yet Arrian admits he was not arbitrary in civil matters. Curtius sometimes draws on sources more sympathetic to Darius. Badian takes bravery as his best-attested quality and shows that many of his choices, from the flight at Issus to the negotiations, were rational given his weak legitimacy and the lack of a successor.

No contemporary Persian view survives; what we call the “Persian perspective” is scholars’ reconstruction from Babylonian documents and a critical reading of the Greek sources. The Alexander Mosaic, a Roman work probably after a Greek painting, shows Darius turning anxiously towards his men, not a heedless fugitive.

Fair history means separating evidence from verdict and asking what each narrator stood to gain from his story.